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Cisco IOS Software NTP Control Mode 7 vulnerability
CSCtd75033

## Description

**Symptom:**
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Cisco IOS Software is affected by 2 NTP mode 7 denial-of-service vulnerabilities:

CVE-2009-3563
and
CVE-2013-5211.

Note: While this DDTS was initialy opened to address CVE-2009-3563, the fix for that vulnerability has a behavior change that affects Cisco IOS
Operations for Mode 7 packets and thus addresses CVE-2013-5211 as well. See the section **Further Description** of this release note enclosure.

**Conditions:**
Note: Conditions section bellow is about the vulnerability addressed under CVE-2009-3563 alone.
The fix for this vulnerability, however, also fixes the underlying cause of CVE-2013-5211 which is a capability to process Mode 7 packets.


Cisco IOS Software with support for Network Time Protocol (NTP) contains a
vulnerability processing specific NTP Control Mode 7 packets. This results in
increased CPU on the device and increased traffic on the network segments.

This is the same as the vulnerability which is described in
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/568372

Cisco has release a public facing vulnerability alert at the following link:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=19540

Cisco IOS Software that has support for NTPv4 is NOT affected. NTPv4 was
introduced into Cisco IOS Software: 12.4(15)XZ, 12.4(20)MR, 12.4(20)T,
12.4(20)YA, 12.4(22)GC1, 12.4(22)MD, 12.4(22)YB, 12.4(22)YD, 12.4(22)YE and
15.0(1)M.

All other versions of Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE Software are affected.

To see if a device is configured with NTP, log into the device and issue the
CLI command show running-config | include ntp. If the output returns

either of the following commands listed then the device is vulnerable:

ntp master
ntp peer
ntp server
ntp broadcast client
ntp multicast client

The following example identifies a Cisco device that is configured with NTP:

router#show running-config | include ntp
ntp peer 192.168.0.12

The following example identifies a Cisco device that is not configured with NTP:

router#show running-config | include ntp
router#

To determine the Cisco IOS Software release that is running on a Cisco
product, administrators can log in to the device and issue the show version
command to display the system banner. The system banner confirms that the
device is running Cisco IOS Software by displaying text similar to "Cisco
Internetwork Operating System Software" or "Cisco IOS Software." The image name

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displays in parentheses, followed by "Version" and the Cisco IOS Software
release name. Other Cisco devices do not have the show version command or may
provide different output.

The following example identifies a Cisco product that is running Cisco IOS
Software Release 12.3(26) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L:

Router#show version
Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software
IOS (tm) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.3(26), RELEASE SOFTWARE
(fc2)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright ) 1986-2008 by cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Mon 17-Mar-08 14:39 by dchih

The following example shows a product that is running Cisco IOS Software
release 12.4(20)T with an image name of C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M:

Router#show version
Cisco IOS Software, 1841 Software (C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version
12.4(20)T, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc3)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright ) 1986-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Thu 10-Jul-08 20:25 by prod_rel_team

Additional information about Cisco IOS Software release naming conventions is
available in "White Paper: Cisco IOS and NX-OS Software Reference Guide" at
the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/ios-ref.html

**Workaround:**
There are no workarounds other than disabling NTP on the device. The following
mitigations have been identified for this vulnerability; only packets destined
for any configured IP address on the device can exploit this vulnerability.
Transit traffic will not exploit this vulnerability.

Note: NTP peer authentication is not a workaround and is still a vulnerable
configuration.

* NTP Access Group

Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a
transport, it is possible to spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat
access control lists (ACLs) that permit communication to these ports from
trusted IP addresses. Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) should be
considered to be used in conjunction to offer a better mitigation solution.

!--- Configure trusted peers for allowed access

access-list 1 permit 171.70.173.55

!--- Apply ACE to the NTP configuration

ntp access-group peer 1

For additional information on NTP access control groups, consult the document
titled "Performing Basic System Management" at the following link:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/netmgmt/configuration/guide/nm_basic_sys_manage.html#wp1034942

* Infrastructure Access Control Lists

Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a
transport, it is possible to spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat
ACLs that permit communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses.
Unicast RPF should be considered to be used in conjunction to offer a better
mitigation solution.

Although it is often difficult to block traffic that transits a network, it is
possible to identify traffic that should never be allowed to target
infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of networks.

Infrastructure ACLs (iACLs) are a network security best practice and should be
considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well as a
workaround for this specific vulnerability. The iACL example below should be

included as part of the deployed infrastructure access-list, which will help
protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range:

!---
!--- Feature: Network Time Protocol (NTP)
!---

access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 123

!--- Note: If the router is acting as a NTP broadcast client

!--- via the interface command "ntp broadcast client"
!--- then broadcast and directed broadcasts must be
!--- filtered as well. The following example covers
!--- an infrastructure address space of 192.168.0.X

access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
host 192.168.0.255 eq ntp
access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
host 255.255.255.255 eq ntp

!--- Note: If the router is acting as a NTP multicast client
!--- via the interface command "ntp multicast client"
!--- then multicast IP packets to the mutlicast group must
!--- be filtered as well. The following example covers
!--- a NTP multicast group of 239.0.0.1 (Default is
!--- 224.0.1.1)

access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
host 239.0.0.1 eq ntp

!--- Deny NTP traffic from all other sources destined
!--- to infrastructure addresses.

access-list 150 deny udp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 123

!--- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in
!--- accordance with existing security policies and
!--- configurations. Permit all other traffic to transit the
!--- device.

access-list 150 permit ip any any

!--- Apply access-list to all interfaces (only one example
!--- shown)

interface fastEthernet 2/0
ip access-group 150 in

The white paper entitled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection
Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques
for infrastructure protection access lists and is available at the following
link

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801a1a55.shtml

* Control Plane Policing

Provided under Control Plane Policing there are two examples. The first aims
at preventing the injection of malicious traffic from untrusted sources, whilst
the second looks at rate limiting NTP traffic to the box.

- Filtering untrusted sources to the device.

Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a
transport, it is possible to spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat

ACLs that permit communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses.
Unicast RPF should be considered to be used in conjunction to offer a better
mitigation solution.

Control Plane Policing (CoPP) can be used to block untrusted UDP traffic to
the device. Cisco IOS software releases 12.0S, 12.2SX, 12.2S, 12.3T, 12.4, and
12.4T support the CoPP feature. CoPP can be configured on a device to help
protect the management and control planes and minimize the risk and
effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks by explicitly permitting only
authorized traffic that is sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with
existing security policies and configurations. The CoPP example below should be
included as part of the deployed CoPP, which will help protect all devices with

IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range.

!--- Feature: Network Time Protocol (NTP)

access-list 150 deny udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 123

!--- Deny NTP traffic from all other sources destined
!--- to the device control plane.

access-list 150 permit udp any any eq 123

!--- Permit (Police or Drop)/Deny (Allow) all other Layer3 and
!--- Layer4 traffic in accordance with existing security policies
!--- and configurations for traffic that is authorized to be sent
!--- to infrastructure devices
!--- Create a Class-Map for traffic to be policed by
!--- the CoPP feature

class-map match-all drop-udp-class
match access-group 150

!--- Create a Policy-Map that will be applied to the
!--- Control-Plane of the device.

policy-map drop-udp-traffic
class drop-udp-class
drop

!--- Apply the Policy-Map to the
!--- Control-Plane of the device

control-plane
service-policy input drop-udp-traffic

In the above CoPP example, the access control list entries (ACEs) that match
the potential exploit packets with the "permit" action result in these packets
being discarded by the policy-map "drop" function, while packets that match the
"deny" action (not shown) are not affected by the policy-map drop function.


- Rate Limiting the traffic to the device
The CoPP example below could be included as part of the deployed CoPP,
which will help protect targeted devices from processing large amounts of NTP
traffic.

Warning: If the rate-limits are exceeded valid NTP traffic may also be
dropped.

!--- Feature: Network Time Protocol (NTP)

access-list 150 permit udp any any eq 123

!--- Create a Class-Map for traffic to be policed by
!--- the CoPP feature

class-map match-all rate-udp-class
match access-group 150

!--- Create a Policy-Map that will be applied to the
!--- Control-Plane of the device.
!--- NOTE: See section "4. Tuning the CoPP Policy" of
!--- http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html#5
!--- for more information on choosing the most
!--- appropriate traffic rates

policy-map rate-udp-traffic
class rate-udp-class
police 10000 1500 1500 conform-action transmit
exceed-action drop violate-action drop

!--- Apply the Policy-Map to the
!--- Control-Plane of the device

control-plane
service-policy input drop-udp-traffic


Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be
found in the documents, "Control Plane Policing Implementation Best Practices"

and "Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2 S - Control Plane Policing" at the
following links:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html and
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t4/feature/guide/gtrtlimt.html

**Further Description**

Cisco IOS Software releases that have the fix for this Cisco bug ID, have a
behavior change for mode 7 private mode packets.

Cisco IOS Software release with the fix for this Cisco bug ID, will not process
NTP mode 7 packets, and will display a message "NTP: Receive: dropping message:
Received NTP private mode packet. 7" if debugs for NTP are enabled.

To have Cisco IOS Software process mode 7 packets, the CLI command ntp
allow mode private should be configured. This is disabled by default.

**Further Problem Description:**

The resolution of this defect introduces a change in behavior, or additional functionality, over previous releases

**Was the description about this Bug Helpful?**                    *(0)*

## Details

**Last Modified:** Feb 11,2014

**Status:** Fixed

**Severity:** 2 Severe

**Product:** Cisco IOS

**Support Cases:** 0

| **Known Affected Releases:** *(6)* |
|---|
| 12.0(1) |
| 12.3(1) |
| 12.2(1) |
| 12.1(1) |
| 12.2XN |
| 12.4(15)T |

| **Known Fixed Releases:** *(78)* |
|---|
| 12.0(32.9.27)SY |
| 12.2(33.3.24)SRD |
| 12.2(32.0.19)SRE |
| 12.0(32)SY9b |
| 12.2(33)SRD4 |
| 12.2(33.5.18)SRC |
| 12.2(33.6.34)SXH |
| 12.2(32.8.11)SX350 |
| 12.4(25c)M0.1 |

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